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Friday, 04 July 2014 22:49

What lies in the Details of the EPA?

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The EPAs and the five ‘Invisible Devils.’

Emmanuel Ametepeh

AI Germany

1.      EPAs in a Nutshell  

The Economic Partnership Agreements EPAs are free trade proposal between the EU and the African, Caribbean, and the Pacific (ACP) countries.

This is intended to replace the old trade regime based on non-reciprocity between the two respective regions. Negotiations started in 2004 and were initially intended to end in December 2007 (Gitau/Govin 2010:1).  By far, the Caribbean region (thus - the CARIFORUM) is the only regional block which has signed a comprehensive EPA.  For most of Africa, negotiations are still ongoing.[1] To end the standoff, the EU has given a dead line up to 1st October 2014. Once a member country of an ACP-country sings the agreement, it commits itself to open up about 80 percent of the country’s market to goods and services Duty Free Quota Free (DFQF) from the Europe EU for the duration of 20 years. In return, apart from sugar and rice, the ACP-countries would have 100 percent access to the European market DFQF (Stevens et al. 2008). For the ratification, the ACP-countries have been grouped into 7 regional blocs. Each block (e.g. ECOWAS, SADC, ESA, PACIFIC, etc.), was intended to negotiate a comprehensive trade agreement with the EU separately. However, as negotiations stalled at the regional level, a parallel approach called: Interim-EPA (IEPA), thus - country by country approach was pursue on bilateral-terms with some individual countries. Countries such as Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Botswana, Mozambique, Lesotho etc. have signed the IEPA, whiles negations still continue on the regional level. ACP-countries undoubtedly needs trade not aid. One will hence wonder why it has taken so long to sign the agreement.[2]

Proposed ‘goals’ of the EPAs:According to the EU, the designed agreement is reportedly aimed at achieving at least four main goals for ACP-countries:

“i. Promoting sustained growth;

 ii. Increasing the production and supply capacity;

 iii. Fostering the structural transformation and diversification of the ACP economies; and

iv. Supporting regional integration.” (Gitau/Govin 2010:1).


 

2.      From Goals to Realities

Numerous studies from independent bodies in the EU, by the UN and in Africa have proved that ratifying of the EPAs will further aggravate the socio-economic situation leading to deepened human destitution and poverty in the region. In other words, in most cases, exactlythe   contraire of the proposed goals would be the outcome. A research carried out by the European Commission delegation from the French National Assembly in 2006 warns for what it calls the four shocks that may hit the ACP-countries if the EPAs are signed. These are: 1. the budget chock, related to reduced customs duties; 2. international trade chock, due to weak currencies; 3. enfant industries chock, because of possible fierce competition from well established firms from the EU; and 4. the agricultural sector shock, due to possible inability to compete with subsidized agro-products from the EU (see The European Commission 2009). The Association of Ghana Industries also recently observes: "The EPA will have negative effects on industry, tax revenues, the potential of economies of scale, employment and income generation. With imports coming from the EU, manufacturing companies will be compelled to fold up, resulting in job losses,"[3] Further, according to a research conducted by the UN Economic Commission for Africa and the South Center, Ghana is expected to loose about $374 million annually. Nigeria estimates that if signed, it could cost up to 1 trillion dollars in revenue lost alone for the proposed period.[4] Signing the EPAs would open the region’s market further to more dumping of foreign goods at a cheaper prices thereby further reducing the masses to consuming society, instead of active productive agents. Efforts to enhance local initiative, production and entrepreneurship, will be jeopardized. A common utilitarian counter position is that consumers in the region will have access to cheaper goods, thereby increasing the wellbeing of the populace through more consumption. This argument may be fundamentally fraud because, life is not only about consuming and consuming, it is equally about producing and producing. Apart from exporting raw materials and few agricultural products, conditions offered by the EPAs have very little (if any) to offer in balancing the equation on the production-side in the ACP-states. 

 In the East African region for instance, due to its relatively higher productive capacity, Kenya supplies other countries in the region with goods and services. With the EPAs, the country might lose that market to the EU (the same scenario applies to Ghana and Nigeria in West Africa). In the case of Uganda and Tanzania, it is estimated that over half of the current tariff revenue would be lost, resulting in substantial lose in government spending. In West Africa as a whole, the situation could be worse since many countries depend heavily on tariff revenues for their budget. The capacity to provide education, health care and other basic needs for the populations by these governments would further be deteriorated.[5]

In response to the controversies surrounding the EPAs, the EU is offering a 6.5 billion euro (thus about 8.8 billion USD) aid package to ECOWAS (thus - the Economic Community of West African States) for a period of five years in return for trade and revenue lost – thus what has been described as an assistance to help ‘shoulder the costs of integrating into the global economy.’ The African development problem has mostly been sought to be solved with development aid while keeping the region out of what has brought development to other regions of the world – thus ‘genuine free trade’. In mathematical terms, the figures of 8.8 billion USD do not add up to the possible financial losses to the region, let alone other long term damages. For instance, ECOWAS  (together with Mauritania) has 16 member states. A common mathematical logic of the 8.8 billion Euros among the 16 states through a period of 5 years shows that each country would receive an approximate of about 110 million USD per year. As mentioned, according the UN Economic Commission for Africa, projected financial loses for Ghana for instance is about 374 million dollars per year – more than threefold what they may receive in aid; and this is just the tip of an iceberg of what the country stands to lose in long term. This calculation finds its parallel in almost all the ACP-countries. In addition, accessing the aid resources do not come on a silver platter, as it is mostly offered only when numerous hurdles of conditionalities are met.  If this analysis holds, one may wonder why the pros and cons of signing or not-signing the EPAs has been described as a “double edged sword”[6] by some top diplomats in the region.


 

  1. Chasing the Devil in the Detail:

The fact that the EU offers 100 percent Duty Free Quota Free access to its market for the ACP-countries, does not mean that the ACP     s can actually export freely into the European markets. Unlike its richer partner, the word ‘free’ here is relative for the poor ACP-countries. The expression: ‘free trade’ might occupy space in the original trade documents but it diminishes significantly or even disappears in the ‘trade-practice’ when the details of the trade-dice is cast between the two parties. Even under the old agreement, many ACP-countries were not able to meet their export quotas they are entitled to into the EU. Poor infrastructure, high transport costs and standards and other factors make it cumbersome for some countries to meet their targets. Further, in most cases, the EU has similar free trade agreement with other regions (e.g. South American and South East Asian countries) such that even though market access may be offered, the African counterparts are mostly outcompeted by its relatively better resourced competitors (Stevens et al. 2008). Apart from stiff competition, in many cases, though the free access may be secured on paper, there are various means to restrict the ACP-countries into their markets, some of which are legitimate due to safety issues. A latest case, where the EC warns Ghana that if the country fails to deal with its ‘illegal, unreported and unregulated’ fishing conditions, it risks a total ban into the EU fish market, underlines this point.[7] Reciprocal action on the part of the ACP-countries in similar situation, is however difficult, reflecting the asymmetrical relations between the two parties.

  

3.1 First detail - Consulting History: AGOA/ EBA

If history is anything to go by, then in the case of EPAs, more attention should be paid to the historical records of trade relationships and agreements between the two parties. Paul Collier, the director of the Center for African Economics at the University of Oxford and an award winning author, conclude in his book ‘The Bottom Billion’ in relation to similar past trade agreements with the following words:

“… Not because they are a bad idea but because the devil is in the details and the details are wrong, probably deliberately – such schemes were designed not to be effective but to appease lobbies (Collier 2007:169).”

He is referring to African Growth and Opportunity Act  (AGOA) between the US and African countries due to expire in 2015 and the Everything but Arms (EBA) arrangements between the EU and the ACP-countries. Collier was right. The same ‘devils’ that occupied the details of AGOA and the EBA leading to their failure to deliver, partly threaten the details of the present EPAs.  

 

3.2 Second detail - The Rules of the Origin (ROOs)

Inputs for modern goods and services are mostly imported from other countries, assembled and again forwarded as exports to other countries. ROOs in a trade agreement, concerns the imported inputs, their origin and the percentage of their content in the final products. ROOs are not obscure or senseless trade mechanism in itself. If there were no Rules of the Origin in trade agreements, then for instance in the Everything but Arms (EBA) agreement, where the least developed ACP-countries, could export Duty Free Quota Free to the EU market, emerging economics (e.g. India, South Africa etc.) may just use the vacuum, produce the goods, label them in any of the EBA-countries (e.g. in Somalia) and then export them to the EU to enjoy the same duty free access. At the moment however, the other extreme holds for the poorest countries in Africa. If for instance Tanzania signs the IEPA, and its neighbor Uganda has not, then If a Tanzanian fish farmer employs an Ugandan laborer, the product is not eligible to enter the EU. The ROOs as it is a double-edged-saw that can be adjusted to suited preferential access either effective for some or detrimental to others (Collier 2007:169)[8]. Because of the asymmetrical power and economic relations between the two parties, conditions such as ROOs is often vulnerable to manipulation to suit the interest of the powerful partner. We do not often hear of trade disputes between for instance the EU and Niger, but we are often reminded of those disputes between the EU and Japan. Likewise, we are not often informed about trade disputes between Ghana and the EU, but we are sometimes informed about trade disagreement between Ghana and Nigeria. It is not the case that trade disputes do not occur between the poor countries and the rich, but rather these disputes often ‘tracelessly’ disappear in the wilderness of the asymmetrical power-relations mostly to the cost of the weaker partner.


 

3.3  Third detail – Who gains what? 

Under the old trade regime, 32 of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in the region currently (at least on paper) benefit from some sort of preferential market access into the EU market for all their products, except arms -  thus, the so-called Everything but Arms agreement (EBA). They   therefore stand to gain nothing from signing the EPA because the conditions of the present preferential treatment will remain constant. They will rather have much to lose since they will be obliged to liberalize 80 percent of their market duty free to European goods, thereby jeopardizing local initiatives for enfant industries.[9] The criteria for inclusion and exclusion. of countries in the EBA in the first glance may seem reasonable, but as Collier agues, it is the most unreasonable decision upon deep reflection. Countries such as Mali           , Guinea, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Liberia are included the EBA arrangements whiles those such as Kenya, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal are excluded. The argument from development point of view is that because the EBA countries are the most least developed, they must be offered the opportunity through the EBA to export to the EU, in order to acquire the tools to ensure human wellbeing. However, beneath lies one of the same old ‘trade-devils’ that has gone unnoticed and may threatens the EPAs as well. On this, Paul Collier questions: “Which African countries stand the better chance of breaking into the global markets for manufactures, those like Somalia or those like Ghana?” He describes this as a ‘headless heart’ decision, of ‘well-meaning gestures rather than well-analyzed actions (Collier 2007:169-70).’ To underscore Colliers observation, many LDCs in the region many, arguably, be described as ‘toothless-lions’ which are unfortunately unable to compete under the EBA and most likely would not be able to do so under the EPAs. When given the opportunity on a fair platform under a fair condition, with its enormous natural and human resources, this countries have enormous potentials and as such something to offer that needs greater attention. However, most unfortunately, these countries are being compelled to lock themselves up in a new trade agreement, which will further compel them to open up their markets for further dumping. Despite this obvious fact, the EU partners have a different line of argument to secure the consent of the LDCs. It insists:

“EPAs are stable partnerships between EU and ACP countries – EPAs establish viable contracts between equal partners which can't be altered without mutual agreement. This is an important difference compared to EBA (which is granted, and not negotiated, by the EU), favoring long-term planning and investment for development.”[10]

 

In other words, it is acknowledged that the components of the old trade arrangements between the EU-EBA-members shall remain constant. The only difference is that the same old conditions would be certified through a formal contract. However, the argument that if signed, it will foster a long term planning and lead to development does not stand the test because, even though the old arrangements was ‘granted’, there was a clear time frame to allow the EBA-countries concrete planning. But as Collier notices, the outcomes were ‘disastrous’ due to reasons outlined in this paper. The fact of the matter is that the question is not really about ‘viable contracts between equal partners’ as we are made to believe. The reality does not reflect any sign of ‘equality’. The fact that a ‘toothless lion’ is admitted into a club of hungry able-bodied-lions through a formal contract, does not necessarily guarantee its safety let alone equal partnership.                

What does the EPAs then has to offer for relatively well off countries such as Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal etc.? Conclusions of a study carried out by the Oversea Development Institute (ODI) of the UK summed up in a 2008 project briefing struggled to find a convening reason for even these set of countries for signing the EPAs arguing that in the best case scenario, some of these countries may have some limited benefits at the initial stage into the agreement, but all things being equal this will not last. In the case of Ghana, the study emphasis:

             “Ghana is fairly typical. It could gain from DFQF if there is new investment to               increase supply, if market demand increases and if there are no new EU restrictions. The      banana industry is most likely to benefit, but as the smallest of three West   African            banana producers, after Cameroon and Côte d’Ivoire, it is not certain             that Ghana will           reap     the potential gains offered by DFQF. It does not export       even as much as it was      entitled to        under the old regime and does not     compete with Latin American countries        that continue             to face EU tariffs (Stevens      et al 2008: p.4).”

On a pessimistic note, The ODI experts concludes: “Recent history indicates that trade preferences granted by the EU to the ACP have been rapidly extended to other suppliers, and the competitive advantage of Duty Free Quota Free could erode in the same way (Ibid).” The obvious question is, if the sophisticated development institutions that might have contributed to design the agreement are in disbelieve whether it would benefit even its relatively able-bodied-partners, then how can we convince the ACP-countries as a group to embrace it?  


 

 

3.4 Fourth detail – EPAs as a threat to Africa’s Integration

Recently, a top diplomat from the EU recommended to the Ghanaian government to regulate trade and restrict the importation of those goods that can be produced in the country. His emphasis was especially on cheaper goods. He insists: “You have to look at how you regulate trade. I am not saying imports are not good, but the cheap ones are the problem. If you can produce something, why import it?”[11] Ghanaweb3 He emphatically warned the Ghanaian government to counter the rice import competition from its neighboring country Cote D’Ivoire by stating: “Cote D’Ivoire is becoming a top reformer in the sub-region and is definitely a threat to Ghana. In terms of trade too, you realize that Ghana imports a lot of rice from them although you can produce [them] and all this go against your competitiveness. (Ibid).” The top diplomat may be right to some extent. However, well intentioned as this proposal may be, to borrow Collier’s expression, ‘the details are wrong’. Good economic performance of a neighboring country in a region like West Africa, should and must not be perceived as a threat to its neighbors. In the era of globalization where regional trade is a key to economic success, it is up to Ghana to strategically concentrate on other areas viable in engaging the Ivoirians in a reciprocal trade-relationship for mutual benefit. Depicting a neighboring country as a ‘threat’ because it is performing well in one sector might be misleading, given the fact that there are numerous areas that Ghana can also comparatively and competitively engage its regional partner for collective success. It is about making good use of the idea of ‘comparative advantage’ that Adam Smith and David Ricardo propagated centuries ago. A rich idea that other regions of the world including the EU have tapped into during their own development process and economic integration.  

The conceptual understanding that underlines such a policy proposal from the diplomat equally manifests itself in the EPA-logic. The observation of the Oversea Development Institute (ODI) of the UK confirms this analogy by stating: “In many cases, current rules do not allow an ACP state to process raw materials that are imported unless they have been produced by a member of the same EPA [block] or the EU (Stevens et al 2008:4).” In other words, if for instance the AU decides to have a comprehensive trade-union as it is in the case of the EU and elsewhere, it can only do so under certain conditions determined by the EPAs. Thus, for instance – Africa would not be allowed to trade with Africa in free terms, just as other parts of the world do within their own regions. In other words, If Nigeria signs the EPA with its ECOWAS peers as a block; and supposing it wants to import raw cocoa from its neighboring country Cameroon to supplement the Nigerians chocolate Industries, this would be illegal under the EPA rules, because Cameroon does not belong to the same EPA block like Nigeria. Africa trades very less with itself. It is estimated that, only 10 to 12 percent of its trade volume can be attributed to inter-regional trade. To be able to alleviate poverty and create jobs for its vast youth population in a sustainable way and thereby avoiding a demographic nightmare, the region must trade with itself. African leaders are finally beginning to recognize this necessity. However, a close analysis of the EPA-conditionalities reveals that the hope for inter regional and continental trade will significantly be deformed.  The fact that the EPAs were originally designed to be signed by regional blocks, and later undermined through divide-and-rule strategy of Interim-EPAs by negotiating them in pieces with different regions and on bilateral basis with individual countries, offers a particular worrying development for Africa’s trade integration ambition.[12] The outcome of this divide-and-rule trade policy associated with the EPAs might probably have started showing early signs of success as 59 trucks full of the goods from Ghana were denied entry into Cote D’Ivoire (a country that has finalized the IEPA) in May this year, due to trade disagreements.[13] Few days later it came to light that Ghana were preparing to drug Cote d’Ivoire to ECOWAS tribunal due to trade disputes.[14]    

 

        3.5 Fifth detail - EPAs as an Economic Governing Strategy

One of the central conditions of the EPAs in the European Commission document reads:

 “EPAs are part of the overall efforts to build up the economic governance framework, the stable transparent and predictable rules necessary to lower the cost of doing business, attract fresh domestic and foreign investments, make producers more diversified and competitive … Everyone should acknowledge that investment, public procurement and competition policy are essential part of successful economic governance.”[15]

The EPAs are more than just trade agreements. Equally, they are partly about economic governance. Thus - It is about sharing the policy space of the ACP-countries and by so doing restricting the present and the future generations policy space in managing their own economic, social and political affairs independently. This is undoubtedly the greatest challenge so far related to Africa’s development if the EPAs are signed. It is not only about free trade or getting off the tariff barriers, it is equally about signing on a set of economic policies and practices which may be detrimental to the regions development and poverty alleviation efforts. Among these challenges are: the liberalization of the public procurements, e.g. If signed, EU-firms must be accorded equal status just as local ACP-countries firms, thus - no prioritization of local firms vis-à-vis the Europeans counterparts; thus it would be unacceptable to require European firms to abide by certain conditions, based on the condition that they are foreign.[16] The non-preferential treatment condition equally holds for other major economic partners in relation to the EU economic interests. For example, the Article 70 (b) of the agreement that the Caribbean block have signed in October 2008 reads: 

“The Signatory CARIFORUM States shall accord to the commercial presences and investors of the EC Party a treatment no less favourable than the most favourable treatment applicable to like commercial presences and investors of any major trading economy with whom they conclude an economic integration agreement after the signature of this Agreement.”

A close analysis of the above condition for the EPAs, reveals that if signed, suppose for instance an ACP-state, say state A, wants to construct a bridge, with a modest budget, and therefore thought it would be wise to contract a Brazilian or an Indian firm, it (state A) may be compelled to opt for an EU construction firm instead, even if the EU-firm costs double the amount of the Brazilian or the Indian. In this sense, the EPAs could be extended into the entire space of self  responsibility, shocking the policy space of individual countries entirely. This type of clauses and conditionalities might have explained the core reason why African countries in particular have been cautious about signing the agreement. Take for instance the above condition that: “Everyone should acknowledge that investment, public procurement and competition policy are essential part of successful economic governance.” As sovereign countries, it would be fair to ask, why everyone ‘should’ endorse a particular economic model as against the other even if it conflicts with the circumstances on the ground. Under the conditions of globalization, there are equally vast trade opportunities offered by the emerging economies such as the BRICs as well as other traditional partners; as such, it would be indeed a deviation from a healthy human logic for the ACP-countries to prematurely lock all eggs in the EPAs-basket.

 In this regard, it may be fair to argue that the EPAs are not only just about trade agreements, but equally an attempt to dictate what the policies should be across a whole range of sectors, towards a much deeper neoliberal principles. Thus an attempt to govern, or at least impose a governance model on the ACP-countries; it is partly about the right to dictate how a country should be govern politically, economically and socially.[17]

 

  1. Reflections

In the real world, two parties usually enter into agreement to reflect their interests, capacities and aims. The EPAs-proposal did paid less attention to this fundamental condition. The EU partners assume that all the 77 ACP-countries might have unified goals and needs compatible with the proposed agreement. Consequently, it is conceived that a comprehensive trade agreement for the entire region should be the right way to go. However, the realities on the ground disapprove this hypothesis. Though countries in the region have commonalities, there are differences in their development expectations and capacities. Nigeria is not the same as Somalia. By insisting to put the African giant such in the same ‘trade-boat’ of Somalia or Togo risks the EU’s opportunity to forge long term trade partnership with key countries in the region. In general, only case-by-case analyses will show whether joining EPAs gives a ACP-state a competitive advantage or not.

 


 

  1. Conclusion

A newly appointed development minister of one of the EU member countries recently states:

“Growth in Africa is about 5% and much higher in places like Ghana and Ivory Coast, Three out of four Africans own a mobile phone, and Ethiopia is leaving its socialist economic system behind and embracing a market economy. We should jump[18] at this opportunity, also for [our] technology […] before others do.”[19]

There is no country or region that has ever developed through the economic structure that has characterized much of the ACP-countries since their independence. A structure which is donor dependent, raw material export and finished product import dependent. And until African countries in particular do their home-work to change this structure, alleviation of human misery, poverty and ensuring a sustainable wellbeing in the region would continue to be an illusion. Though the so-called GDP related ‘Africa rising’ is to large extent exaggerated, it should however been underlined that the continent as well as the Caribbean and Pacific regions have enormous opportunities that should be harnessed for its wellbeing. Africa as a whole has today over one billion population. A vast market potential which should not be reduced to mere passive, unproductive consuming block. Failure to do so risks a ticking time bomb for mass political and social unrest in the near future.

The remarks of the development minister quoted above vividly hints one of the central reasons why, EPAs, is vigorously forced down on the leaders in the region, despite the controversies in the details. It is about safeguarding the market opportunities the region presents and at the same time ensuring safe access to the region’s vast natural resources thereby protecting the status quo. But there is one thing that seems increasingly undisputable in today’s global economy. It is unrealistic in today’s globalized and increasingly interconnected world to safeguard the numerous opportunities one regions presents solely for the interest of one partner. This is particularly the case in an ever changing world of overlapping interests from other major powers. It may be successful in the short term, but its long term prospects is dim. Two seminal documents (one by the Corporate Council on Africa and another by the collaboration between the Wilson Center & Manchester Trade) underscore this argument. The documents call on the American government to proactively prevent the EPAs to be passed, because doing so would undermine the American trade-interest in the region. The documents insists that any final trade agreement must give room for the ACP-countries to negotiate a reasonable deadlines to allow the region a breathing space for its own integration goals, allowing ample time for Africa to conclude a Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) and the African Customs Union as it was foreseen in the Abuja Treaty.[20] It is not only the US that is beginning to develop greater interest in the opportunities that the ACP-countries offer, but also Africans themselves, the Japanese, the Koreans, the Brazilians, the Indians, the Chinese, the Russians etc. have all shown their interest. Undoubtedly, the world has evolved quite dramatically in the last few decades and continues to do so. With new conflicting and overlapping interests which accompany it, it may be less reasonable to insist filling old wines in new bottles despite the danger of conflict of interest, especially between the major powers. On the part of the ACP-countries, if common sense should be allow to prevail, there is rarely a reason for locking themselves up in a long term commitment whiles shutting the doors of other numerous opportunities. Given its vast natural resources and demographic dividend, Africa in particular cannot be ignored in the 21st century. And locking up a whole continent to meet the interest of one region may be elusive (at least in the long term). It is up to the Africans to realize its growing importance, and make the best out of it for its populations.     

 As mentioned above, there are numerous independent bodies which have all confirmed that the EPAs  are potential ‘single-edged-sword’ to the advantage of the ACP-countries, and not a double-edged-sword as some proclaim. The question is, if the EPAs has clearly failed to integrate the interests of the ACP-countries, why is it still an instrument for negotiation in the first place? Because the ‘devils’ that often lie in the details of the asymmetrical interdependent relation between center and peripheries, often mysteriously escape the apparent mathematical and common sense additions of the naked mind. As a result, it may be less astonishing, when a top trade diplomat of Ghana insists that the EPAs are actually double-edged-sword by arguing: “It is like the witches’ dance. If you dance forward you will lose your mother, if you dance backwards you will lose your father.’ He explains: “If we sign, there are ramifications and implications for the Ghanaian economy, if you withhold or postpone signing, there are dire consequences which will lead to the dying of your mother.”[21] A zigzag-dance, that African leaders and people in particular, have been subjected to for a long time, partly due to an own inaction and lack of political will to collectively invent a strategic dance which has the capacity to save ‘both parents.’

  

Sources:

Asante, S.K.B (2010). Europe’s Brand of a Trojan Horse? Africa and the Economic Partnership Agreements, Tema, Ghana.

Collier, P. (2007). The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are failing and what we can do about it, Oxford.

Gitau, R./Govin,T. (2010). Trading our Lives with Europeans, Possible Impacts on Human Rights by the Framework for the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the East African Community (Kenya) and the European Union. By the Kenya Haman Rights Commission, Nairobi, Kenya.    

 Stevens, C./Meyn, M./ Kennan, J. (2008). Duty-free, quota-free access: What is it worth? ODI Project Briefings 10. See web: http://www.odi.org.uk/publications/566-duty-free-quota-free-access-worth. Accessed on: 09.06.14.   

 

 

 



[1]European Commission ,Overview of the EPA Negotiations‘, Updated: May 2014. See Web:  http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/september/tradoc_144912.pdf. Accessed on: 10.06.14.

[2][2] Ibid.

[5] The EU’s ‘Economic Partnership Agreements’,  A speech delivered by Andy Storey of the School of Politics and International Relations at University College Dublin, November 2007. See video:  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GKHt2GQm7FE. Accessed on 07.06.14. 

[6] ‘Signing EPA or not will come with a cost’ :  Ghanaweb, April 12, 2014. See Web:  http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/business/artikel.php?ID=306039. Accessed on: 10.06.14.

[7]‘Illegal Fishing Could See EU Ban Fish Imports from Ghana’:  Fish Maestro: June 12, 2014. See Web:  http://www.fishfarmingedu.com.ng/4370/illegal-fishing-could-see-eu-ban-fish-imports-from-ghana/ . Accessed on: 17.06.2014.

[8] See also: Asante 2010: 13-14.

[9]Economic Partnership Agreements – still pushing the wrong deal for Africa?  See Web: www.stopepa.de/img/EPAs_Briefing.pdf . Accessed on: 10.06.14.

[10] European Commission ,Overview of the EPA Negotiations‘, Updated: May 2014. See Web:  http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/september/tradoc_144912.pdf. Accessed on: 10.06.14.

[11] “Ghana’s Commitment to Manufacturing shaky”: Ghanaweb, November 6, 2013. See Web: http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=291116. Accessed on 06.11.13.

[12] For more information, see: Labor and Research Institute (2008): Economic Partnership Agreements: The new Game of Divide and Rule, Windhoek, Namibia. 

[15] The EU’s ‘Economic Partnership Agreements’,  A speech delivered by Andy Storey of the School of Politics and International Relations at University College Dublin, November 2007. See video:  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GKHt2GQm7FE. Accessed on 07.06.14.  

[16] Ibid.

[17] See: Asante (2010: 56-65) for more on development dangers of the EPAs.

[18]Emphasis added at source of quotation.

[19]Quoted by Kumi Naidoo, in a Conference organized by the Heinrich-Böll-Foundation, Titled: “I can’t eat GDP” - 25 February 2014, Berlin. See Video:  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iWKxu1WrO84: Accessed on 11.06.14.  

[20] Stephen McDonald . Stephen Lande . Dennis Matanda, Why the Economic Partnership Agreements Undermine Regional Integration? a Wilson Center & Manchester Trade collaboration Piii See Web: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EPA%20Article.pdf. Accessed on 10.06.14.

[21]There will be unpleasant consequences if Ghana signs EPA”, NSEM. See Web:  http://www.nsempii.com/?p=4893 : Accessed on 17.06.14.  

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